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Abstract
The Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the General
Assembly on 13 September 2007, after more than twenty years of negotiations between
states, indigenous representatives, lawyers, and academics. Although the resulting
document is controversial and complex in its treatment of several important issues, its
ambiguous characterization of the collective legal right of indigenous peoples to selfdetermination has been chosen as the focus of this work because it is the primary right
from which all other rights, and problems, are derived. The work commences with a
critique of the position held by certain states that the categorization of indigenous
populations as legal ‘peoples’ in the Declaration is inappropriate. Secondly, the
juxtaposition between internal and external self-determination is used as a framework for
analyzing the extent of self-determination that indigenous peoples are entitled to, with the
conclusion that neither may states limit the right to a pre-defined outcome, nor may
indigenous peoples claim an unqualified external right under international law. Thirdly,
this paper argues that the historical relationship of indigenous peoples to (international)
law makes the latter an insufficient tool for determining how their future rights as
outlined in the Declaration should be interpreted. When the voice of reason is employed
to compensate for the law’s shortfalls, it is found that an inherent right of indigenous
peoples to freedom of existence accompanies and fortifies their legal right. Finally, the
author speculates upon how the translation of the above interpretation of the rights of
indigenous peoples into treaty law could summon a dramatic makeover of state visage
throughout the international community.
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‘The draft Declaration is not a short or simple document, but long and complicated, as
befits the complexity of the subject matter.’

– Erica-Irene Daes, Chairperson/Rapporteur of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations, United Nations 1

1

Kly Y.N. & Kly D., p56
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1

INTRODUCTION
International attention on the rights of indigenous peoples has increased in recent

years, funneling itself through the first and second United Nations International Decades
of the World’s Indigenous People in 1994-2004 and 2005-2015 respectively, the creation
of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues in 2000, and the taking of
office by the first UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and
fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples in 2001. What may be viewed as the zenith
of this focus was attained on September 13 of this year through the long-awaited adoption
of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (hereafter referred
to as “the Declaration”) by the General Assembly, with 143 nation-states in favor, 4
countries voting against, and 11 abstentions. 2
The adoption of the declaration is the result of more than twenty years of
negotiations between nation-states and indigenous peoples. The United Nations Working
Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), established in 1982 as a subsidiary organ of
the Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights in part to focus
on the evolution of international standards concerning indigenous rights (EcoSoc
resolution 1982/34), submitted a draft Declaration to the Sub-Commission in 1993, who
adopted it by resolution 1994/45 and then sent it on to the Working Group on the Draft
Declaration (WGDD: an inter-sessional working group established by the Commission on
Human Rights) for review. The WGDD was in conflict over several issues (which will
soon be outlined), and it wasn’t until their eleventh meeting in February 2006 that the
Chairperson-Rapporteur proposed that a revised version of the text would be presented to

2
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Zealand
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the Commission on Human Rights (now the Human Rights Council) for adoption. 3 The
Human Rights Council adopted the declaration by 30 votes to 2 (with 12 abstentions) on
29 June 2006, and recommended it for adoption to the General Assembly where it was
recently passed.
In spite of the fact that more than two decades have been devoted to its
development, the Declaration in its final form is controversial, complex and ambiguous.
That its wrinkles are ironed out, or at least mulled over in greater depth, is of high
importance because the Declaration itself is a significant document: it can be treated as
coherent summary of the rights of indigenous peoples in international law, 4 which have
up until now been articulated in a piecemeal fashion through various organizations such
as the International Labor Organization (ILO), the World Bank (WB), the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP), the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO),
and different UN Human Rights Monitoring Bodies. 5 Further, while the Declaration does
not create any immediate binding obligations under international law, it is important
because it may contribute to a growing body of customary international law. It also
establishes a moral framework which is likely to have an impact on domestic legislation
and political affairs.
Given the significance of the Declaration, it is useful to skim the surface of some
of its most important complications before approaching the substantive issue of this
work, in order that my final study is understood to be but one of several topics in the field
of indigenous rights requiring further analysis. First, the controversies surrounding the

3
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meaning of indigenous peoples in international law have resulted in the absence of a
definition in the Declaration, which some argue is a necessary part of allowing the
indigenous to determine their own identity, but others maintain leaves the rights within
the document available for use by anyone who identifies themselves as indigenous,
thereby removing the specificity of their claims. 6 Second, the collectivity of rights within
the Declaration is a departure from the traditional occupation of human rights law with
the rights of individuals. While an international consensus on the applicability of human
rights to collectivities is certainly developing, concern that this new approach will lead to
the erosion of individual rights remains. Third, the issue of land rights remains a source
of confrontation between the interests of indigenous peoples in retaining their spiritual,
ancestral, medicinal, and economic links to land, and states who prize the economic value
of the often-richly-laden territories that indigenous peoples lay claim to. 7 Fourth, debate
exists over whether the components of the Declaration will be generative of customary
law or not, in which experts such as S. James Anaya and Siegried Wiessner argue in the
affirmative, 8 but several state representatives (and particularly those from the U.S, New
Zealand, Australia and Canada) argue in the negative. 9 Fifth, while indigenous
participation was prominent in the WGIP, there are grievances aimed at the Commission
on Human Rights for failing in its “real task … to guarantee the greatest possible degree
of indigenous participation in the further consideration…of the Draft Declaration. 10 As

6

Although imperfect, the definition used by Jose Martinez Cobo in his study of the Problem of
Discrimination against Indigenous Populations (1986) is broadly accepted as being helpful, and is included
in part 2.2 of this work
7
Interview with Morse Flores, 21 November 2007
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such, the governance over the contents of the final product has been taken out of the
hands of exactly those stakeholders whom it most concerns.
While all of these debates are relevant and to some extent interconnected, they are
deliberately marginalized in this work to make room for a focus on the conflict regarding
the nature and extent of the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination as
articulated in the Declaration. This is commonly regarded as being the most controversial
aspect of the Declaration and also its cornerstone, for self-determination is the primary
collective right which enables the exercise of all other rights.
The work commences with a questioning of whether indigenous peoples are
‘peoples’ under international law, which has implications on their right to selfdetermination. The negating arguments of states and experts are critiqued through
reference to a conglomerate of definitions as well as the evolution of international law to
affirm that the categorization of indigenous populations as ‘peoples’ is valid.
Second, this categorization is used to examine the extent of the right to selfdetermination in the Declaration as interpreted by stakeholders, using the distinction
between internal and external self-determination as a unit of analysis. The professed
reasons of States to seek to limit the right to an internal dimension are proven to be
invalid, while the preference of indigenous peoples for an unqualified right is also not
permissible.
Third, the limitations of the law as a tool of analyzing the rights of indigenous
peoples are acknowledged. When these are remedied through the application of common
sense, it is found that an additional inherent right of indigenous populations to self-

International Decade of the World’s Indigenous Peoples”, organised by the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Commission, Sydney, 29 April 1995
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determination exists beyond that derived from their categorization as peoples. This
fattens up their case.
Fourth, the impact of implementing the Declaration’s principles as interpreted in
this work on the visage of the state are examined, with the conclusion that some dramatic
changes to our societal organization may lie on the horizon.

2

THE

CATEGORIZATION

OF

INDIGENOUS

POPULATIONS

AS

‘PEOPLES’ UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

2.1

Introduction
An exploration of the nature of the indigenous right to self-determination begins

with an examination of whether or not they meet the criteria of ‘peoples’ with an ‘s’
under international law. What may at first glance be a trivial question of semantics is in
fact a crucial determiner in our discussion because the right to self-determination in
international law is solely derived from the holder’s status as a ‘peoples.’ This is firmly
entrenched in General Assembly resolutions, human rights treaties, international
instruments, and international jurisprudence. 11

2.2

The use of ‘peoples’ in the Declaration
The Declaration is crafted from the standpoint that the categorization of

indigenous populations as ‘peoples’ is appropriate. Pre-ambular paragraph 2 of the
declaration affirms that

11

Bohre, 21

9

‘indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples…, 12
while Article 2 states that
‘indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and
individuals.’
Furthermore, Article 3 of the Declaration is constructed in reflection of Articles 1
of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR):
Article three of the declaration states that:
“Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and
cultural development.”
While Articles 1 of the covenants state that:
“All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.”
At this point, it is necessary to mention the claim made by the United States that
such excerpts were “not intended…to indicate that indigenous peoples automatically
qualify as ‘peoples’ for the purposes of common articles 1.” 13 The present author rejects
this claim on the basis of the absence of a disclaimer attached to the final document
similar to the one attached to ILO Convention (No. 169) concerning Indigenous and
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Article 1 (3) in guarantee that such a

12
13

All excerpts of legislation in this work are replicated in the annex and cited in the bibliography
Hagen, (Observations), p3
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qualification would not be made. 14 If the intention did not exist, it could have been easily
and clearly indicated.

2.3

The validity of the categorization in the Declaration
Important parties question whether this categorization of indigenous peoples as

“peoples” is legally and historically correct. 15 The United States has argued that
“peoples” in international law are entire peoples of a state, or those who constitute
themselves as a sovereign independent state, and not particular groups within existing
states. 16 Robert T. Coulter of the Indian Law Resource Center supports this view by
arguing that no “people” within an existing state has ever been given a distinct right of
self-determination by the UN and state practice beyond ordinary access to government. 17
In order to respond to these contentions, it is necessary to look at international
legal practice and doctrine, and also the definitions of ‘peoples’ which have accumulated
over the decades. Addressing the first requirement, it is the response of this paper that
both the United States and Coulter seem to be narrowly focused on the original intentions
behind Articles 1 of the covenants, which were crafted during the decolonization period
and were therefore primarily concerned with bestowing the right to self-determination
upon groups living in territories under foreign domination or occupation so that they
could reach national independence. 18 They were also applied to entire national

14

ILO Convention 169 1(3) reads that ‘the use of the term “peoples” in this Convention shall not be
construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international
law.”
15
International Center Seminar, Marie Leger, ‘Recognition of the Right to Self-Determination of
Indigenous Peoples: Asset or Threat?’ p4
16
DDWG3, Pritchard p73
17
Coulter, p2-3
18
Bohre, p22
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populations of independent states, 19 as the U.S has rightly pointed out. However, it is
important to note that the reason why the aim of Articles 1 was originally not deliberately
inclusive of indigenous peoples (although notably not exclusive either) was that the
concept of indigenous rights had not been born yet; indeed, indigenous populations still
held the status of ‘minorities’ or ‘the un-christianized.’ 20
However, it is not sufficient to merely examine where international law was five
decades ago, but how it has developed in state practice since then. Indeed,

recent

international practice and doctrine demonstrates that the meaning of ‘peoples’ as
pertaining to Articles 1 of the covenants now applies to ethnic sub-groups within
encompassing states or crossing such states’ international borders.21
Secondly, although single legal definitions of ‘peoples’ and ‘indigenous peoples’
do not exist, an application of a conglomerate of the commonly used definitions of
‘peoples’ to the commonly used definitions of ‘indigenous peoples’ leaves no reason to
believe that the categorization is not a snug fit.
The Chairperson/Rapporteur of the WGIP has defined a people according to “the
extent to which the group…shares ethnic, linguistic, religious or cultural bonds, although
the absence or weakness of one of these bonds need not invalidate a claim, [and by] the
extent to which members within the group perceive the group’s identity as distinct from
the identities of other groups.” 22
Similarly, Vincent A. Bohre has taken the common denominators of past and
present definitions of peoples to summarize that the subjects must feature most or all of

19

Ibid, p22
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21
Bohre, p17
22
Daes, p5
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the following: a common history, a historical territorial connection, a common ethnic
identity or origin, cultural homogeneity, linguistic unity, a common religion or spiritual
tradition or ideology, common social, political and economic attributes, and the
subjective criterion of a “collective belief of being a distinct people and a wish to be
recognized as such, as well as the desire to live together and to share a common future.” 23
Indigenous populations clearly meet the requirements of these definitions, and the
lack of a singular legal conceptualization of indigenous should not impede the integrity of
such recognition. In her Explanatory Note on the UN Draft Declaration, the Chairperson
of the WGIP asserted that, “[i]ndigenous groups are unquestionably ‘peoples’ in every
political, social, cultural and ethnological meaning of this term” and that “it is neither
logical nor scientific to treat them as the same ‘peoples’ as their neighbors, who
obviously have different languages, histories and cultures.” 24 The Indigenous Caucus
supports this view in stating that “we are united by our histories as distinct societies, by
our languages, laws, traditions and unique spiritual and economic relationships with our
lands and territories.” 25 Further, the most commonly-used definition of indigenous
peoples, being that of Martinez Cobo, incorporates all critical aspects including a
“historical continuity,” a self-perception of being “distinct,” a desire to preserve for
“future generations…ancestral territories,” and a shared “ethnic identity” and “own
cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.” 26 While it is not within the scope
of this work to conduct detailed studies of the characteristics of different indigenous
populations around the world, the validity of these definitions and the consequent

23

Bohre 18
Mackay, 15
25
WGDD 5, Pritchard, 41
26
Cobo, International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs, available at http://www.iwgia.org/sw310.asp
24
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categorization can be confirmed by considering the defining features of the Maori in New
Zealand, the 12 indigenous nationalities of Ecuador, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islanders of Australia, the Hill Tribes of Thailand, the Inuit of Alaska, and so forth.
Finally, it should be noted that the alternative to categorizing indigenous peoples
as ‘peoples’ would be to leave them in the recently-used category of minorities, which is
inappropriate because minority rights are individual rights, and therefore lack the strong
political component necessary to protect a collective unit of humanity. 27
It is thus logical to conclude that the Declaration correctly derives a right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination from their categorization as ‘peoples’ under
international law.

3

THE EXTENT OF THE RIGHT OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES TO SELFDETERMINATION IN THE DECLARATION

3.1

An ambiguous articulation
Even with the categorization recognized in the above section, the navigation

through the grey mists of the Declaration’s references to the extent of the right to selfdetermination is difficult. In at least two respects, its ambiguity is appropriate: Given the
diverse array of indigenous peoples all around the world, each of which has a unique
relationship and legal history with encompassing or neighboring states, it is ambitious to
reach a consensus on an international Declaration that accommodates the preferences of
all stakeholders. For this reason, ‘constructive ambiguity’ has been seen as an appropriate
27

Bohre p14. An additional categorization of indigenous peoples is proposed in section 4 of this work
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tool. 28 Furthermore, given that the document at hand is a declaration and not a treaty,
priority is given to expressing the general essence of the rights and not the intricate
details of their manifestation and implementation. 29 In spite of these justifications, the
ambiguities in my view attribute the Declaration with the potential to exacerbate stateindigenous relations rather than clarify them. While this section argues against the
perspectives held by some states on the meaning of self-determination in the text, it is
recognized that the debate is far from exhausted.

3.2

The distinction between internal and external self-determination
The distinction between internal and external self-determination – though

imperfect – 30 is a useful tool for framing the debate over the extent of the right as it
pertains to indigenous peoples. Internal self-determination is a right within the borders of
encompassing states. Conversely, external self-determination is commonly associated
with secession, but this is neither an accurate nor an exclusive translation. First,
secession implies the reassertion of sovereignty which was once relinquished, and yet
much dispossession of indigenous land occurred without indigenous consent. As such,
separation and independence are more precise usages. Second, external self-determination
could and should also include independent relationships that indigenous peoples may
exercise in the international sphere; e.g international supervision of decisions by indigenous
peoples about their political status, and a role for states and organs of the United Nations to
provide financial/technical assistance and mechanisms for dialogue, treaty enforcement,
28

Littlechild, p4
Ibid, p4
30
The shortfall of this approach is that it has a tendency of expressing self-determination in terms of
predefined outcomes instead of the ongoing, evolving concept which many indigenous peoples wish it to
be.
29
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and dispute resolution between peoples and states.31 Considering the broader meaning of
external self-determination, this juxtaposition will be used as a framework for analysis.

3.3

The claims for internal self-determination only
Many states have issued specific statements limiting the right of self-

determination articulated in the Declaration to an application within the internal context.
Robert Hill from Australia has asserted that “nothing in the Declaration should authorize
the impairment of the territorial integrity of a state,” 32 and Takahiro Shinyo from Japan
claims that the Declaration does not bestow “a right to be separate from the country of
residence.” 33 The U.S delegation has supported the use of the term “internal selfdetermination,” 34 the United Kingdom has contended that the right is “only to be
exercised within the territory of the state,” 35 while Jordan, Mexico and Sweden have also
proposed that self-determination only applies within the state structure.36
The publicly expressed rationale for this viewpoint is threefold. First, it is asserted
that since most indigenous peoples don’t push for anything beyond internal selfdetermination, 37 it is not necessary to become concerned about the arguable potential for
the Declaration to authorize the impairment of a state’s territorial integrity or political
unity. Even the WGDD, they point out, premised its discussions on the assurances of
some indigenous delegations that they did not want to secede. 38

31

Pritchard, p86
GA/10612, p5
33
Ibid., p9
34
Coulter, p4
35
Ibid., p10
36
Ibid., p11
37
Bohre, p30. See also Pritchard 77, and Coulter ‘Indigenous Peoples and the Law of Self-Determination’
p6
38
Chairperson’s summaries, WGDD 5, Prichard p80
32
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Second, Article 43 of the Declaration states that
‘The rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the survival,
wellbeing, and dignity of the indigenous peoples of the world.’
This suggests to some that limiting the right of self-determination in the Declaration to an
‘internal’ dimension only would not detract from the claims of some indigenous peoples
that they are entitled to self-determination which spills over state borders.
Third, and most substantially, they claim that this limitation on the right to selfdetermination is clearly articulated in the Declaration. Article 4 of the Declaration, which
confers the ‘right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal
and local affairs…’ was deliberately placed in tandem with Article 3, 39 which suggests
that Article 4 is actually an exhaustive definition of the broad right articulated in Article
3. 40 Self-determination for indigenous peoples is therefore seen to be limited to autonomy
or self-government over internal affairs. Furthermore, Article 46 concludes the
Declaration by staking out that
‘Nothing in this Declaration may be…construed as authorizing…any action
which would…impair…the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States.” As Robert Coulter summarizes, the principle of territorial integrity
has always had the paramount place, and still does today. 41

3.4

The invalidity of the argument for a limited ‘internal’ self-determination
The arguments put forth by states and experts seeking to limit the right of

indigenous peoples to self-determination to an internal dimension do not hold. They will
39

E/CN.4/2006/79, p7
See Appendix or section 1 for a refresher of the content of Article 3
41
Coulter (Indigenous Peoples and the Law of Self-Determination), p5
40
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be dealt with in the order in which they have been introduced; however, attention will be
allocated according to the fact that the last point bears far greater significance than its
predecessors.
It is true that the majorities of indigenous peoples around the world recognize and
prioritize the benefits of partnerships with existing states. Furthermore, many define selfdetermination in terms of a subjective feeling of being control over their way of life,
rather than through the existence of tangible institutions and statuses. 42 However, this in
itself removes neither their desire nor their entitlement to the right to full and unqualified
self-determination. That the desire still exists was evident when indigenous
representatives in the WGIP vehemently opposed any attempt to limit or qualify their
right to self-determination; 43 when the International Indian Treaty Council stated that
“indigenous…peoples who so desire should be granted the full rights and obligations of
external self-determination; 44 and when Lars Anders Baer of the Saami Council
challenged the suggestion that only the internal aspects of the right of self-determination
applied to indigenous peoples. 45 That the entitlement still exists is clear in the simple
fact that rights and obligations are generally not diminished nor exalted due to the
reactions they invoke in their subjects.
The second argument is also dubious: Although it is true that the Declaration is a
minimum standard, it is also a coherent summary. 46 If indigenous peoples do have an
essential right to self-determination, then a diluted and qualified expression of this right

42

International Center Seminar, Marie Leger, ‘Understanding the Right to Self-Determination and its
Attendant Obligations,’ p26
43
Pritchard, p59
44
Ibid, p60
45
DDWG 1997, ibid p71
46
See Introduction

18

in the Declaration would suggest that only the latter is truly bullet-proof in international
law, significantly problematizing any attempts by indigenous parties to lay legal claims
based on the former.
Before addressing the third point raised by ‘doubters,’ it is important to briefly
introduce an additional argument against an expression of a limited right in the
Declaration, being, a violation of the equal rights of all ‘peoples.’ Some indigenous
representatives have argued that the a priori exclusion of the option of independent
statehood would discriminatorily relegate them to a category inferior to the selfdetermination of other colonized peoples. This has been labeled a violation of article 2 of the
UN Charter which expresses the principles of equality and self-determination of peoples as
"two complementary parts of one standard of conduct.”47 In other words, all the different
peoples in the world have equal rights to self-determination.
The final argument relating to what the declaration expresses about the right
brings us to the heart of the debate between the relationship of the principle of territorial
integrity and the principle of self-determination. In address of the issue of the tandem
situation of Article 3 and Article 4, to my knowledge there is no evidence in reports of the
Working Group that suggest that this deliberate consecution was intended to provide an
exhaustive effect. It could indicate a preference or an example of the essential principle’s
manifestation, and need not be interpreted as a comprehensive definition. Nowhere is
external self-determination expressly excluded in the Declaration.
Article 46 is an abbreviated ‘copy-and-paste’ of international legislation which
inaccurately suggests the superiority of the principle of territorial integrity over the right
47
See generally S Pritchard, “International Law”, in The Laws of Australia - Aborigines and Torres Strait
Islanders, Law Book Co Sydney 1993, at 81-82
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of peoples to self-determination. To correct this implication, it is necessary to consult the
legal documents from which the Article has been derived. Article 1 of the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among
States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (the “Friendly Relations
Declaration”) provides that:
[nothing in the Declaration related to the rights of peoples to self-determination]
“shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or
impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal
rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
as to race, creed or color.”
[Emphasis added]
This qualification is reinforced by the 1993 ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme
of Action’ and the 1995 ‘Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the
United Nations.’ 48
As such, international law can be interpreted as requiring states to represent the
whole people belonging to the territory and to act in compliance with the concept of
equal rights and self-determination in order to be eligible to their right of territorial
integrity and political unity. The Chairperson/Rapporteur of the Working Group supports
this by employing the criterion of being “effectively representative; 49 and Bohre uses the

48
49

See Annex for relevant excerpts of this legislation
McKay, p15
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expression that “only as long as this internal spirit of self-determination is allowed to
prosper will its external ghost remain concealed.” 50 (Bohre’s quotation should be
modified to incorporate the idea that the ‘first’resort’ concept of internal selfdetermination should not preclude the opportunity for indigenous peoples to exercise
external relations with international bodies such as the UN in conjunction.) And yet, in
spite of all of these qualifications, secession remains neither forbidden nor warranted in
international law.

3.5

Conclusion
The conclusion must be that the arguments put forward by states that only the

internal dimension of self-determination applies to indigenous peoples is invalid, and yet
an unqualified right to violate territorial borders does not apply to indigenous peoples
under current international law either. Instead, states must be effectively representative in
order to preserve their territorial integrity.

4

AN INHERENT RIGHT BEYOND THAT OF ‘PEOPLES’?

4.1

Introduction
Up until now, the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination has been

analyzed in a strictly legal sense; e.g it has been derived from their categorization as legal
‘peoples’ and from the body of law addressing the right to self-determination and the
50

Bohre, p40
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principle of territorial integrity. While the present author appreciates the importance of
law in international and domestic relations, she is also aware that the evolution of
international law has marginalized and deliberately oppressed indigenous peoples, thus
making it a state-biased source of reference as to what their future rights should be. It is
therefore considered an insufficient resource of analysis which needs to be supplemented
by common sense and reason. When this is done, it is found that the legal right of
indigenous populations is ‘padded’ by a natural right which they may have due to their
unique characteristics above and beyond those which are consistent with the features of
‘peoples.’ This does not significantly change the direction of my argument; it merely
reinforces the right of indigenous populations to self-determination and compensates for
the lack of clarity in the legal sphere.

4.2

The law: a state-biased source of deriving the rights of indigenous peoples
While it is ordinary to derive our understanding of what our rights and responsibilities

are according to what the law says, it is also necessary that we sometimes use our
understanding of what our natural and reasonably expected rights and responsibilities are
in order to verify that the law is being crafted in a legitimate direction. It is often difficult
to know whether the time is appropriate to consult only the chicken (the standardization
of reason, e.g the law) or also the egg (the reason itself), but in the case of indigenous
peoples, it is clearly the egg which must be considered on par with its descendant.
This is because indigenous peoples have been categorically excluded as subjects of
positivist international law, and as such, the international legal framework’s coverage of
the rights of indigenous peoples lags behind it’s coverage of other rights, and also lags
22

behind academic and common-sense thinking. The development of the “Law of Nations,”
or inter-nation-al law as it is today known, lead to a framework of the state versus the
individual, in which the former monopolized the concept of group autonomy rights and
left no place for the rights of alternative associational groupings. 51 Not only were
indigenous peoples in “legal limbo” 52 (or, otherwise put, somewhere between the ‘rock’
of state rights and the ‘hard place’ of individual rights); but the law actually became a
rationalizing force for their oppression through colonization. To give but two examples,
the ‘Great Debate’ between Las Casas and Sepulveda over the Spanish Conquest was
framed by critical arguments of medieval theology, Christocentric and philosophical
natural law, the Ius Gentium, Canon Law, and Roman law, rendering it ‘Eurocentric,
Christian, provincial and aggressive in its incorporation of those who played no part in its
making.’ 53 Later, three early 19th century Supreme Court decisions legitimized the U.S
title to Indian land on the basis of discovery alone. 54
The very idea of international law, therefore, has undermined the existence of
indigenous peoples. While this cannot forever render the use of law in determining
indigenous rights as obsolete, it does mean that the use of common sense alongside the
use of law is fair and appropriate.

51

Bohre, p7
Ibid, p2
53
Thornberry, ‘Ambiguous discourses’ p4
54
Bohre, p8
52
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4.3

Indigenous ‘peoples’ are more than just ‘peoples’
While it has already been established that indigenous peoples fit the criteria of

‘peoples’ in international law, it is hereby argued that they embody more than that
minimum standard of a collective. As Coulter points out (although with a different endpoint in mind), indigenous populations typically bear the following traits in addition to
those of ‘peoples’: 55 Firstly, they tend to exist as functioning societies and political
entities. Second, they often still have a definite territory with legally defined membership.
In my view most importantly, they pre-date the states in which they are located. In other
words, their existence is not derived from the state, and so to solely subject them to their
rights as groups subordinate to states would be inappropriate. It should also be noted that
they have their own laws and governments or other institutions of social control, and
were often excluded from participating in the constitutional creation of the state.
The result of these ‘bonus-features’ is that indigenous peoples are typically far
more cohesive as a distinct collective unit than what the standard of ‘peoples’ requires.
Their territorial ownership and political organization which pre-dates the existence of the
state suggests that they have an inherent right to self-determination that exists before and
after the state system of international law. 56 Unless these defining features were
voluntarily, consciously and legally relinquished through the birth of the state, there are
no reasonable grounds for this artificial modern construct to limit their ability of freely
exercising their unique way of life. This inherent right should be considered in parallel
with the already-explored legal right.
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5

THE CHANGING VISAGE OF THE STATE
It is not in the realm of declarations to concern themselves with implementation.

Nevertheless, some preliminary speculations about what it might mean for governments
to be effectively representative of indigenous peoples to the same degree as other
peoples, in a way that reflects their inherent and legal right to exist independently, is both
fun and not inappropriate in this instance. This is supported by Article 38, which dictates
that
‘States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the
appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this
Declaration.’ The document’s reference to implementation inevitably summons the
question of what kind it might be referring to.
When such reflection takes place, it is found that states may be required to make
dramatic changes to their visage in order to keep indigenous peoples within their internal
sphere. Article 19 is a useful launching pad for analyzing the extent of change that may
be required:
Article 19:
‘States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and
informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative
measures which may affect them.’
( Emphasis added)
Many states perceive this as radical. Robert Hill from Australia has stated that a
standard cannot be applied to indigenous peoples which is not applied to others in the
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population; Australia does not accept a right that allows a particular subgroup to be able
to veto legitimate decisions of a democratic and representative govt. 57 Similarly, John
McNee of Canada has claimed that the establishment of complete veto power over
legislative action for a particular group would be fundamentally incompatible with
Canada’s parliamentary system. 58 Rosemary Banks from New Zealand has argued that
the article gives ‘indigenous peoples a right of veto over a democratic legislature and
national resource management...that other…groups or individuals do not have;’ 59 and
Jairo Montoya of Colombia said that Article 19 is in direct contradiction with Colombia’s
internal legal system. 60
These reactions are not unjustified: Article 19 highlights a potentially serious
incompatibility between the current practices of representative democracy, constitutional
supremacy, and the relationship between international and domestic law on the one hand,
and the requirements of states to accommodate the rights of different ‘peoples’ within its
domain on the other. The obligation to obtain consent from indigenous peoples before
making decisions which may affect their internal concerns such as land, culture, political
organization, etc may be seen as undemocratic from the point of view that governmental
decisions should be made on the basis of the opinions of the individuals who have elected
them. However, if states are now comprised not only of a collection of individuals but
also of a series of ‘peoples’ – indeed, a series of nations – then the basic decision-making
structures of the state such as the executive, legislature and judiciary, need to adapt to
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reflect this. This is what Sarah Pritchard calls ‘belated state-building’ 61 and what I call
‘state make-over.’
It may further be time for the proliferation of the concept of pluri-nationalism,
which impacts societal organization in Ecuador. 62 Although they are often seen as
coincidental, the nation and the state have always been separate entities. That we begin to
recognize the existence of different nations within one state is not only helpful to the
indigenous problem, but is also consistent with the transformative impact of globalization
on the nation-state. Increased migration flows are changing the demographic make-up of
states around the world, while the rise of terrorists, transnational corporations, and other
non-state actors are eroding the conventional predominance of the state structure in
global legal and political relations.
To make changes to the basic construction of the state requires both political
bravery and creativity, but should not lead to fear of a radical expunging of power. Just
like good marriages are created through the existence of the possibility of divorce, the
clarification of the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination outside the sphere
of the state should strengthen, and not diminish, their existence within it.

6

CONCLUSION
The Declaration is not yet three months old, and so any attempt to discern its

meaning and consequence at this stage will inevitably be leaky and invite controversy.
Nevertheless, this work has attempted to establish that 1) the derivation of indigenous
populations’ right to self-determination from their categorization as ‘peoples’ in the
61
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Declaration is correct, according to international legal evolution and definitions; 2)
although ambiguous, the Declaration gives indigenous peoples a right to external selfdetermination if their encompassing states are not representative of them to the same
degree as other peoples within the state; 3) the aforementioned legal right is accompanied
by a rational inherent right of these pre-existing groups to have control over their own
political, economic, social and cultural affairs; 4) these arguments suggest a widereaching scope of indigenous peoples to internal self-determination, which – if exercised
properly – may require a timely change to the make-up of states which is also
incidentally suitable to global trends.
It can be hoped that greater consensus on these ideas will come with the passing
of time and the trading of perspectives between states, indigenous peoples, lawyers,
academics, and philosophers, and that they can be put into practice in a peaceful manner.
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United Nations A/RES/61/295
Distr.: General
2 October 2007
Sixty-first session
Agenda item 68
06-51207
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly
[without reference to a Main Committee (A/61/L.67 and Add.1)]
61/295.
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The General Assembly,
Taking note of the recommendation of the Human Rights Council contained in
its resolution 1/2 of 29 June 2006,1 by which the Council adopted the text of the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Recalling its resolution 61/178 of 20 December 2006, by which it decided to
defer consideration of and action on the Declaration to allow time for further
consultations thereon, and also decided to conclude its consideration before the end
of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly,
Adopts the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as
contained in the annex to the present resolution.
107th plenary meeting
13 September 2007
Annex
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
The General Assembly,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
and good faith in the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by States in accordance
with the Charter,
Affirming that indigenous peoples are equal to all other peoples, while
recognizing the right of all peoples to be different, to consider themselves different,
and to be respected as such,
Affirming also that all peoples contribute to the diversity and richness of
civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind,
_______________
1 See Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-first Session, Supplement No. 53
(A/61/53), part one,
chap. II, sect. A.
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Affirming further that all doctrines, policies and practices based on or
advocating superiority of peoples or individuals on the basis of national origin or
racial, religious, ethnic or cultural differences are racist, scientifically false, legally
invalid, morally condemnable and socially unjust,
Reaffirming that indigenous peoples, in the exercise of their rights, should be
free from discrimination of any kind,
Concerned that indigenous peoples have suffered from historic injustices as a
result of, inter alia, their colonization and dispossession of their lands, territories
and resources, thus preventing them from exercising, in particular, their right to
development in accordance with their own needs and interests,
Recognizing the urgent need to respect and promote the inherent rights of
indigenous peoples which derive from their political, economic and social structures
and from their cultures, spiritual traditions, histories and philosophies, especially
their rights to their lands, territories and resources,
Recognizing also the urgent need to respect and promote the rights of
indigenous peoples affirmed in treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements with States,
Welcoming the fact that indigenous peoples are organizing themselves for
political, economic, social and cultural enhancement and in order to bring to an end
all forms of discrimination and oppression wherever they occur,
Convinced that control by indigenous peoples over developments affecting
them and their lands, territories and resources will enable them to maintain and
strengthen their institutions, cultures and traditions, and to promote their
development in accordance with their aspirations and needs,
Recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional
practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper
management of the environment,
Emphasizing the contribution of the demilitarization of the lands and
territories of indigenous peoples to peace, economic and social progress and
development, understanding and friendly relations among nations and peoples of the
world,
Recognizing in particular the right of indigenous families and communities to
retain shared responsibility for the upbringing, training, education and well-being of
their children, consistent with the rights of the child,
Considering that the rights affirmed in treaties, agreements and other
constructive arrangements between States and indigenous peoples are, in some
situations, matters of international concern, interest, responsibility and character,
Considering also that treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements, and the relationship they represent, are the basis for a strengthened
partnership between indigenous peoples and States,
Acknowledging that the Charter of the United Nations, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights2 and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,2 as well as the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
_______________
2 See resolution 2200 A (XXI), annex.
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3
Action,3 affirm the fundamental importance of the right to self-determination of all
peoples, by virtue of which they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development,
Bearing in mind that nothing in this Declaration may be used to deny any
peoples their right to self-determination, exercised in conformity with international
law,
Convinced that the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this
Declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the State
and indigenous peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for
human rights, non-discrimination and good faith,
Encouraging States to comply with and effectively implement all their
obligations as they apply to indigenous peoples under international instruments, in
particular those related to human rights, in consultation and cooperation with the
peoples concerned,
Emphasizing that the United Nations has an important and continuing role to
play in promoting and protecting the rights of indigenous peoples,
Believing that this Declaration is a further important step forward for the
recognition, promotion and protection of the rights and freedoms of indigenous
peoples and in the development of relevant activities of the United Nations system
in this field,
Recognizing and reaffirming that indigenous individuals are entitled without
discrimination to all human rights recognized in international law, and that
indigenous peoples possess collective rights which are indispensable for their
existence, well-being and integral development as peoples,
Recognizing that the situation of indigenous peoples varies from region to
region and from country to country and that the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical and cultural backgrounds should be taken into
consideration,
Solemnly proclaims the following United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples as a standard of achievement to be pursued in a spirit of
partnership and mutual respect:
Article 1
Indigenous peoples have the right to the full enjoyment, as a collective or as
individuals, of all human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognized in the
Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights4 and
international human rights law.
Article 2
Indigenous peoples and individuals are free and equal to all other peoples and
individuals and have the right to be free from any kind of discrimination, in the
exercise of their rights, in particular that based on their indigenous origin or
identity.
_______________
3 A/CONF.157/24 (Part I), chap. III.
4 Resolution 217 A (III).
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4
Article 3
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.
Article 4
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the
right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local
affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.
Article 5
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right
to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural
life of the State.
Article 6
Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality.
Article 7
1. Indigenous individuals have the rights to life, physical and mental
integrity, liberty and security of person.
2. Indigenous peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace
and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide or
any other act of violence, including forcibly removing children of the group to
another group.
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to
forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress
for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their
integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their
lands, territories or resources;
(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of
violating or undermining any of their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic
discrimination directed against them.
Article 9
Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right to belong to an indigenous
community or nation, in accordance with the traditions and customs of the
A/RES/61/295
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community or nation concerned. No discrimination of any kind may arise from the
exercise of such a right.
Article 10
Indigenous peoples shall not be forcibly removed from their lands or
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territories. No relocation shall take place without the free, prior and informed
consent of the indigenous peoples concerned and after agreement on just and fair
compensation and, where possible, with the option of return.
Article 11
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural
traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop the
past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological and
historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and
performing arts and literature.
2. States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may
include restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect
to their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their
free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and
customs.
Article 12
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to manifest, practise, develop and
teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and ceremonies; the right to
maintain, protect, and have access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites; the
right to the use and control of their ceremonial objects; and the right to the
repatriation of their human remains.
2. States shall seek to enable the access and/or repatriation of ceremonial
objects and human remains in their possession through fair, transparent and
effective mechanisms developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples concerned.
Article 13
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit
to future generations their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing
systems and literatures, and to designate and retain their own names for
communities, places and persons.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected
and also to ensure that indigenous peoples can understand and be understood in
political, legal and administrative proceedings, where necessary through the
provision of interpretation or by other appropriate means.
Article 14
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish and control their
educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in
a manner appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning.
2. Indigenous individuals, particularly children, have the right to all levels
and forms of education of the State without discrimination.
A/RES/61/295
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3. States shall, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, take effective
measures, in order for indigenous individuals, particularly children, including those
living outside their communities, to have access, when possible, to an education in
their own culture and provided in their own language.
Article 15
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the dignity and diversity of their
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cultures, traditions, histories and aspirations which shall be appropriately reflected
in education and public information.
2. States shall take effective measures, in consultation and cooperation with
the indigenous peoples concerned, to combat prejudice and eliminate discrimination
and to promote tolerance, understanding and good relations among indigenous
peoples and all other segments of society.
Article 16
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to establish their own media in their
own languages and to have access to all forms of non-indigenous media without
discrimination.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that State-owned media
duly reflect indigenous cultural diversity. States, without prejudice to ensuring full
freedom of expression, should encourage privately owned media to adequately
reflect indigenous cultural diversity.
Article 17
1. Indigenous individuals and peoples have the right to enjoy fully all rights
established under applicable international and domestic labour law.
2. States shall in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples take
specific measures to protect indigenous children from economic exploitation and
from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the
child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental,
spiritual, moral or social development, taking into account their special vulnerability
and the importance of education for their empowerment.
3. Indigenous individuals have the right not to be subjected to any
discriminatory conditions of labour and, inter alia, employment or salary.
Article 18
Indigenous peoples have the right to participate in decision-making in matters
which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by themselves in
accordance with their own procedures, as well as to maintain and develop their own
indigenous decision-making institutions.
Article 19
States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples
concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain their free,
prior and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or
administrative measures that may affect them.
A/RES/61/295
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Article 20
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political,
economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their
own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their
traditional and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and
development are entitled to just and fair redress.
Article 21
1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the
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improvement of their economic and social conditions, including, inter alia, in the
areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing,
sanitation, health and social security.
2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special
measures to ensure continuing improvement of their economic and social
conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of
indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities.
Article 22
1. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of
indigenous elders, women, youth, children and persons with disabilities in the
implementation of this Declaration.
2. States shall take measures, in conjunction with indigenous peoples, to
ensure that indigenous women and children enjoy the full protection and guarantees
against all forms of violence and discrimination.
Article 23
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for exercising their right to development. In particular, indigenous peoples
have the right to be actively involved in developing and determining health, housing
and other economic and social programmes affecting them and, as far as possible, to
administer such programmes through their own institutions.
Article 24
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and to
maintain their health practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal
plants, animals and minerals. Indigenous individuals also have the right to access,
without any discrimination, to all social and health services.
2. Indigenous individuals have an equal right to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health. States shall take the
necessary steps with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of this
right.
Article 25
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive
spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used
lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their
responsibilities to future generations in this regard.
A/RES/61/295
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Article 26
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or acquired.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the
lands, territories and resources that they possess by reason of traditional ownership
or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise
acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands,
territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted with due respect to
the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples
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concerned.
Article 27
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with indigenous peoples
concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, open and transparent process, giving due
recognition to indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure
systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous peoples pertaining to
their lands, territories and resources, including those which were traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied or used. Indigenous peoples shall have the right to
participate in this process.
Article 28
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to redress, by means that can include
restitution or, when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for
the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise
occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, taken, occupied, used or
damaged without their free, prior and informed consent.
2. Unless otherwise freely agreed upon by the peoples concerned,
compensation shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality,
size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress.
Article 29
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the conservation and protection of
the environment and the productive capacity of their lands or territories and
resources. States shall establish and implement assistance programmes for
indigenous peoples for such conservation and protection, without discrimination.
2. States shall take effective measures to ensure that no storage or disposal
of hazardous materials shall take place in the lands or territories of indigenous
peoples without their free, prior and informed consent.
3. States shall also take effective measures to ensure, as needed, that
programmes for monitoring, maintaining and restoring the health of indigenous
peoples, as developed and implemented by the peoples affected by such materials,
are duly implemented.
A/RES/61/295
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Article 30
1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of
indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest or otherwise freely
agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.
2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples
concerned, through appropriate procedures and in particular through their
representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military
activities.
Article 31
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and
develop their cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural
expressions, as well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and
cultures, including human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of
the properties of fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and
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traditional games and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to
maintain, control, protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural
heritage, traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.
2. In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective
measures to recognize and protect the exercise of these rights.
Article 32
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use of their lands or territories and other resources.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their
lands or territories and other resources, particularly in connection with the
development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.
3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any
such activities, and appropriate measures shall be taken to mitigate adverse
environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.
Article 33
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine their own identity or
membership in accordance with their customs and traditions. This does not impair
the right of indigenous individuals to obtain citizenship of the States in which they
live.
2. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the structures and to
select the membership of their institutions in accordance with their own procedures.
Article 34
Indigenous peoples have the right to promote, develop and maintain their
institutional structures and their distinctive customs, spirituality, traditions,
procedures, practices and, in the cases where they exist, juridical systems or
customs, in accordance with international human rights standards.
A/RES/61/295
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Article 35
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine the responsibilities of
individuals to their communities.
Article 36
1. Indigenous peoples, in particular those divided by international borders,
have the right to maintain and develop contacts, relations and cooperation, including
activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their
own members as well as other peoples across borders.
2. States, in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall
take effective measures to facilitate the exercise and ensure the implementation of
this right.
Article 37
1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and
enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive arrangements concluded
with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements.

37

2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or
eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties, agreements and
other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the
appropriate measures, including legislative measures, to achieve the ends of this
Declaration.
Article 39
Indigenous peoples have the right to have access to financial and technical
assistance from States and through international cooperation, for the enjoyment of
the rights contained in this Declaration.
Article 40
Indigenous peoples have the right to access to and prompt decision through
just and fair procedures for the resolution of conflicts and disputes with States or
other parties, as well as to effective remedies for all infringements of their
individual and collective rights. Such a decision shall give due consideration to the
customs, traditions, rules and legal systems of the indigenous peoples concerned and
international human rights.
Article 41
The organs and specialized agencies of the United Nations system and other
intergovernmental organizations shall contribute to the full realization of the
provisions of this Declaration through the mobilization, inter alia, of financial
cooperation and technical assistance. Ways and means of ensuring participation of
indigenous peoples on issues affecting them shall be established.
A/RES/61/295
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Article 42
The United Nations, its bodies, including the Permanent Forum on Indigenous
Issues, and specialized agencies, including at the country level, and States shall
promote respect for and full application of the provisions of this Declaration and
follow up the effectiveness of this Declaration.
Article 43
The rights recognized herein constitute the minimum standards for the
survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world.
Article 44
All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally guaranteed to male
and female indigenous individuals.
Article 45
Nothing in this Declaration may be construed as diminishing or extinguishing
the rights indigenous peoples have now or may acquire in the future.
Article 46
1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State,
people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.
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2. In the exercise of the rights enunciated in the present Declaration, human
rights and fundamental freedoms of all shall be respected. The exercise of the rights
set forth in this Declaration shall be subject only to such limitations as are
determined by law and in accordance with international human rights obligations.
Any such limitations shall be non-discriminatory and strictly necessary solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and for meeting the just and most compelling requirements of a democratic
society.
3. The provisions set forth in this Declaration shall be interpreted in
accordance with the principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights,
equality, non-discrimination, good governance and good faith.

Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, UNGA
Res. 2625 (XXV), 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
Reprinted in (1970) 9 I.L.M. 1292:

The General Assembly,
…
1. Solemnly proclaims the following principles:
…
The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples
enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to
determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their
economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect
this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate
action, realization of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter, and to render assistance to the United Nations in carrying out
the responsibilities entrusted to it by the Charter regarding the
implementation of the principle, in order:
(a) To promote friendly relations and co-operation among States;
and
(b) To bring a speedy end to colonialism, having due regard to the
freely expressed will of the peoples concerned;
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and bearing in mind that subjection of peoples to alien subjugation,
domination and exploitation constitutes a violation of the principle, as
well as a denial of fundamental human rights, and is contrary to the
Charter.
Every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate action
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in accordance with the Charter.
The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free
association or integration with an independent State or the emergence
into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present
principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and
independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible
action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such
peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the
purposes and principles of the Charter.
The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the
Charter, a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering
it; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the
people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right
of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes
and principles.
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without
distinction as to race, creed or colour.
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United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, adopted June 25, 1993, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/24 (Part I)
at 20 (1993), reprinted in (1993) 32 I.L.M. 1661, para. 2:
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status, and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.
Taking into account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or
other forms of alien domination or foreign occupation, the World
Conference on Human Rights recognizes the right of peoples to take any
legitimate action, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, to
realize their inalienable right of self-determination. The World Conference
on Human Rights considers the denial of the right of self-determination as
a violation of human rights and underlines the importance of the effective
realization of this right.
In accordance with the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, this shall not be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a Government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction
of any kind.

1995 Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations G.A.
Res. 50/6, October 24, 1995:
1. To meet these challenges, and while recognizing that action to secure global peace,
security and stability will be futile unless the economic and social needs of people are
addressed, we will:
…
- Continue to reaffirm the right of self-determination of all peoples, taking into
account the particular situation of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien
domination or foreign occupation, and recognize the right of peoples to take
legitimate action in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations to realize
their inalienable right of self-determination. This shall not be construed as
authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair,
totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and thus possessed of a
Government representing the whole people belonging to the territory
without distinction of any kind…
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Schweizer, Mme Natalie. coordinator of projects at the Graduate Institute for
International Studies 24/10/07
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ISP HUMAN RESOURCE LIST
Anaya, S. James
World expert on indigenous rights in international law
anaya@law.arizona.edu
Sent email, no reply
Barnes, Ambassador Ronald
Ambassador to Indigenous Peoples and Nations Coalition-Alaska
0795419430
rfbipnc@hotmail.com
1 meeting, 1 email, 2 phone calls
Burger, Julian
Head Indigenous Peoples and Minorities Team, OHCHR
jburger@ohchr.org
0229289272
1 meeting, several phone calls and emails
De Zayas, Dr Alfred
Expert on Human Rights Council, minority issues, international law, and more
022/7882231
alfreddezayas@gmail.com
4 phone calls, 4 emails, 2 meetings (1 cancelled)
Dhamai, Binota Moy
UN Fellow – Intern at ILO
TRIPURA community, Bangladesh
bdtripura@hotmail.com , bdtripura@gmail.com
1 meeting
Dickson, Matiu
expert on Maori legal issues, Waikato University, New Zealand
matiu@waikato.ac.nz
1 email, no solid leads
Flores, Morse
Technical Officer, PRO169/IP IED Programs, ILO
(Indigenous Phillipines)
flores.morse@gmail.com 076 304 1052
1 meeting, several emails, several phone calls
Ghebali, Dr Victor-Yves
Expert on UN Reform, HEI
022 908 57 38
ghebali@hei.unige.ch
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2 phone calls, 3 emails, 1 meeting
Gonella-Frichner, Tonya
Permanent Forum Expert 2008-2010 - indigenous nominated
American Indian Law Alliance
aila@ailanyc.org
Phone +1 212 477 91 00
Fax +1 212 477 00 04
2 emails, 1 phone call, no reply
Indigenous Peoples’ Centre for Documentation, Research and Information (DoCip)
14. av. De Trembley, 1209 Geneva
0227403433
danica@docip.org
Pierrette Birraux, Scientific Director pierrette@docip.org
Benigno Delgado, documentalist documentation@docip.org
Several emails, several phone calls, 2 visits
Joffe, Paul
Grand Council of the Crees
p.joffeympatico.ca
sent email, currently in Montreal but is willing to have a phone conversation about it
Jones, Carwyn
Lawyer on Maori issues, Victoria University of New Zealand
Carwyn.jones@vuw.ac.nz
3 emails, referred me to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NZ
Littlechild, Wilton
Permanent Forum Expert 2002-2004 et 2005-2007
International Organization of Indigenous Resource Development/Four Cree Nations
winsport@incentre.net
jwlittle@incentre.net
Phone +1 780 585 30 38; cell +1 780 36 17 527
Fax +1 780 585 20 25
2 emails, no reply
Malezer, Les
Foundation for Aboriginal and Islander Research Action (FAIRA)
Les.malezeraira.org.au
Sent email, no reply
Pinero, Luis
International lawyer
0229179134
1 phone call, but out of the country until mid-December
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Schweizer, Mme Natalie
coordinatrice de projects, Graduate Institute of International Studies
0229085742
schweiz9@hei.unige.ch
1 meeting, several contacts, several emails
Slimane, Samia
OHCHR
sslimane@ohchr.org
0229289379
Several phone calls, several emails, no leads
Venne, Sharone
Chief Negotiator, Deninu Kue First Nation, Yellow Knives Dene First Nation, NWT
Treaty and Tribal Corporation
oldwomanbear@hotmail.com
Phone +1 80 78 73 92 82
Fax +1 80 78 73 87 38
2 emails, no reply
Wissener, Siegfried
Expert on indigenous rights in international law
Wiessner@stu.edu
Sent email, no reply

Websites with further human resources
NativeWeb www.nativeweb.com
Cultural Survival www.culturalsurvival.org
Indian Law Resource Center www.indianlaw.org/default.htm
Assembly of First Nations (Canada) www.afn.ca
Inuit Circumpolar Conference www.inuit.org
Metis Nation of Ontario www.metisnation.org
Navajo/ Hopi and Black Mesa www.blackmesais.org
Navajo Nation www.navajo.org
Sami News (in Sami) www.saamiweb.org
Sami Parliament (in Sami) www.sametinget.se
San of South Africa www.sametinget.se
Haudenosaunee Homepage www.sixnations.org
Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs www.ubcic.bc.ca
The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Centre www.itpcentre.org
Survival International www.survival-international.org
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ISP INTERACTIVE RESEARCH
For contact information, see ‘Human Resource List’

Dr Victor-Yves Ghebali
Expert on UN Reform
When: 26/09, 2pm-3.30pm
Where: 6th floor, 19 Chemin de Palettes, Geneva
Take Tram 15 to Palettes (approx 20mins). 200m further up is Coop supermarket. Behind
that is building. Front door code: *****
Preparation:
- What possibilities are there for a project on UN reform?
- What is the scope for research on SC enlargement?
- Is the presence of a hegemonic power that violates international norms acceptable
and ‘normal’ in global affairs?
Outcomes:
- Consider Human Rights Council, Indigenous Peoples, Legitimization by Security
Council of Occupation of Iraq, Peacebuilding Commission
- Yes it is normal. It is only acceptable when these norms are violated for the
‘good’

Professor Alfred de Zayas
Expert on Human Rights Council, minority issues, international law, and more
When: 17/10, 2pm-3.10pm
Where: Restaurant de Cent Suisse
Take Bus 8 to Red Cross, walk up (past UN entrance) approx 300m, near U.S Mission
and tennis club
Preparation:
- What is the scope for research on politicization of Human Rights Council?
- Is the HRC a positive development?
- Was it necessary?
- What exactly has changed?
- Isn’t politicization of UN organs always a problem?
- Who else can I talk to on this issue?
Outcomes:
- Indigenous peoples is a more interesting topic than the Human Rights Council
- But if want to do HRC, could discuss process of change from commission
- In his view, unnecessary, hasn’t changed much, if anything made worse
- Yes, politicization is always a problem
- If you do the Human Rights Council, get in touch with Ronald Barnes
- Introduced me to the ambassadors of Ecuador and Cuba
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Mme. Natalie Schweizer
Coordinatrice de projects, Graduate Institute of International Studies
When: 24/10, 2pm-3.30pm
Where: 3rd floor of pink building, HEI, 132 Rue de Lausanne
Take Bus 1 from train station in direction of Jardin Botanique. Get off at Secheron, walk
10m in direction of bus, path to HEI on the right
Preparation:
- Can you direct me to contacts and resources related to the process of crafting the
Declaration?
- What is the scope for research on a ‘cluster’ within the Dec., e.g selfdetermination or land?
- Could you potentially be an advisor on this subject?
Outcomes:
- A list of resources and contacts
Benigno Delgado
Documentalist, Indigenous Peoples' Center for Documentation, Research and Information
When: 1/11, 3pm
Where: DoCip, 14 av. de Trembley, 1209 Geneva
Preparation:
- Info and opinions on whether the articles in the U.N Dec. pertaining to selfdetermination (particularly 3, 4, 46 and 19) have the character of international
customary law.
- Any info on state practices and opinio juris of relevance to above articles
- Countries of particular interest: US, Canada, NZ, Australia
- Documentation on interpretations of SD in the Dec
- Human contacts in Geneva?
Outcomes:
- Thesis of Bohre, University of Amsterdam
- Document on Africa’s position
- Reference to website

Pierrette Birraux Scientific Director, Indigenous Peoples' Center for
Documentation, Research and Information
When: 1/11, 4pm
Where: DoCip, 14 av. de Trembley, 1209 Geneva
Preparation:
- Human contacts in Geneva?
Outcomes:
- Try Julian Burger, OHCHR (already had him)

Ambassador Ronald Barnes
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Author of shadow report to UN Human Rights Council, representative of Alaskan Tribes
When: 6/11, 9am-10.15am
Where: 3rd floor, United Nations library
Preparation:
- Does Article 1 of the covenants refer specifically to external self-determination?
Can indigenous people be considered peopleS under international law, with the
same rights to S-D as those conferred in article 1? If yes, why is there a need to
reproduce what has already been established in international law? Why is there a
need for a special section of international law for indigenous people(s)? If not,
why do you think that the same language was used in A3 of the DRIP as in the
covenants, thereby implying the same meaning?
- The U.S view is that it is not in the mandate of Working Group to qualify, limit or
expand the scope of existing legal obligatons in common article 1, and never
intent of states to do so. Is this true? What was the mandate of the WG?
- What is to be made of Article 19 of the DRIP? Is this intended to confer the right
of veto over democratic legislation to IP? What kind of situations or
circumstances do you think that A19 was intended for?
- For what reasons related to self-determination are you opposed to the treaty?
Outcomes:
- Received a copy of his shadow report
- Attention drawn to changes from draft declaration
- Attention drawn to concept of ‘constructive ambiguity’
- Referred to Sharone Venne, Moana Jackson, Tanya Fischner, Wilton Littlechild,
Charmane Whiteface, whose contact details may be found through DoCip
- See Vienna Declaration Law of Treaties 31-35
- Peoples: It was never said that ‘peoples’ does NOT include indigenous
- Alaskan peoples have full scope and application of right to SD under charter and
international law. Any limitation on this right within DRIP is not accepted
- What is the article in the DRIP which says that the DRIP does not reduce existing
treaties?
- There is a need for IL on IP, because some IP not non-SG territories, some no
treaties
- Westphalian model of states

Professor Alfred de Zayas
Expert on minority issues, international lawyer, and more
When: 19/11, 9am
Where: #23 Chemin Crete de Pregney
Take #8 bus to OMS, walk in direction of bus, new building of OMS on the right, go
around the building and behind it, follow path for 5mins to chemin
Preparation
- What factors determine the need for a declaration instead of mere domestic law or
treaties?

50

-

Is there a need for a definition on ‘indigenous’ and ‘peoples’? What does
‘peoples’ mean? Was the U.S correct in claiming that it is only reserved for
national populations?
- “Consult.” Does this give them a higher position than the state?
- “Self-determination.” Is it only the essence that matters, or also the manifestation?
Is the ambiguity ok and normal?
- What is the relationship between the laws of territorial integrity and the rights of
indigenous to external self-determination?
- Who else can I contact on these issues?
Outcomes
The actual interview never took place. I fell sick with tummy-bug and couldn’t leave my
bed. I asked him for a phone interview instead, but he was awaiting a call from Germany.
He suggested that I call in the evening, but I was unable to reach him. The next day he
left for the U.S to celebrate Thanksgiving.

Morse Flores
Technical Officer, PRO169/IPIED Programs, ILO
When: 21/11 2pm-3pm
Where: Room 19, 11th floor, International Labor Organization
Preparation:
- What are the main objections to indigenous peoples being considered ‘peoples’
under IL ? US: only whole populations underneath a state. No definitions of IP
nor P
- Is there any recent international practice or doctrine which supports the idea that
ethnic sub-groups can be considered peoples?
- What kind of meaning does the declaration attach to SD? An ‘essence,’ internal
only, internal predominantly, or both internal and external?
- Is it an evolving concept, or a pre-defined outcome?
- Is it even useful to view self-determination in terms of internal and external?
- Given that this is a declaration and not a treaty, is it acceptable that there is
ambiguity? ‘Constructive ambiguity’
- Some argue that it isn’t even relevant to discuss any issue of external SD in the
dec because it is minimum standard only, and IP generally don’t seek it
Do these arguments hold any weight?
- Setting aside the Dec. for the moment, when the Covenants and other legal
instruments say that peoples have a right to self-determination, is there any
elaboration on what this means? E.g extent? Does the principle of territorial
integrity of states take priority over the principle of SD, provided that governance
is representative?
- Some say that external SD is a political principle, and not yet a rule of IL for
rights of peoples. What is your response to this?
- Is the right of IP to SD solely derived from their (arguable) categorization as
peoples, or is there some unique characteristic about IP which makes them
distinct even from the common characteristics of other ‘peoples’?
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Outcomes:
- Received contact of Luis Pinero 0229179134
- Economic autonomy equally important as political autonomy
- Question is not so much ‘what’ are the main objections to the classification as
‘peoples,’ but WHY. Answer: natural resource
- Lots of IP on cross-border territories
- Territorial integrity is not something set in stone
- Rights of indigenous was not an issue at the time of creation of A1 of covenants
- Saami, and Greenland Home-Rule examples of good autonomy systems

Binota Moy Dhamai
Expert on indigenous TRIPURA community, Bangladesh
When: 21/11 3pm-3.30pm
Where: Room 21, 11th floor, International Labor Organization
Preparation: Unexpected interview, so asked many of the questions directed at Mr
Flores, in addition to
- how do you see the declaration having an impact on domestic state-indigenous
relations in Bangladesh?
- How important is economic autonomy to the TRIPURA peoples?
- What do the TRIPURA peoples want?
Outcomes:
- accent very thick: I could understand almost nothing
- Provision of a text: ‘Indigenous Peoples in International Law’ by Patrick
Thornberry
- Invitation to attend Indigenous Caucus and Informal UN Meeting Dec 4-7

Julian Burger Head of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities Team
Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
When: Initial interview scheduled for 16/11. Mr Burger requested a rescheduling after
his trip to Spain. Upon his return, I was sick with the tummy bug. We thus communicated
via email and telephone
Where: UNHCHR, 48 Giuseppe, Motta, road leading up to UN
Preparation:
- What is your general reaction to the Declaration?
- Does it clarify relations between indigenous peoples and States?
- What is your reaction to the criticisms launched by states against Article 19?
- What is your opinion on the meaning of Article 3?
- What is the future of the Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in the wake of
the Declaration?
Outcomes:
- No substantial outcomes to record
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Indigenous Caucus Meeting
When: 4-5 December
Where: Room XXIV, Palais des Nations, Geneva
Preparation: Registration with patricia@docip.org

Informal Meeting of the UN Human Rights Council
When: 6 December, 10am
Where: Room XVII, Palais des Nations, Geneva
Preparation: Registration with mpena@ohchr.org

Due to illness between 16-22 November, I was unable to conduct as much interactive
research as I would have liked. I am compensating for this lack of networking
opportunity by attending the meetings of the Indigenous Caucus and the Human Rights
Council in the first week of December.
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CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN RESEARCH
08/09 Lecture on UN Reform by Professor Ghebali
This inspired me to study the reform of the United Nations for my ISP
17/09 ISP advising session: Gyula Csurgai
Discussed scope for researching UN reform. Csurgai suggested enlargement of Security
Council and referred me to Professor Ghebali as an advisor
Follow-up: Rang Professor Ghebali, organized meeting for Wednesday, 26 September
Total time: Approx 0.5hrs
18/09 – 25/09 Background reading on issues of UN Reform, including Security Council
enlargement, Human Rights Council, Peacebuilding Commission
Total time: Approx. 3 hours
26/09 Meeting with Professor Ghebali
See ‘interactive research.’
Total time: Approx. 3 hours
09/10 - 10/10 Research on possible topics: Peacebuilding Commission, Human Rights
Council, Indigenous Peoples, UNSC legitimization of invasion of Iraq, Security Council
enlargement
Decision on final topic: Human Rights Council
Total time: Approx.8 hours
11/10 Background research at UN library on Human Rights Council
Sent email to Ghebali, informing of decision on topic
Received contact person from Ghebali, expert on HRC
Emailed her for meeting
Total time: Approx 3 hours
12/10 ISP Advising Session, Alexandre Lambert
Aims:
- to seek approval for my ISP topic
- To ask whether he knows of potential resources
- To clarify interactive research hours
Outcomes:
- Approval
- Interactive research clarified
- Contact Professor De Zayas (see ‘Human Resource List’
- Research UN reform, Human Rights Council, international human rights law
Follow-up: emailed Professor de Zayas
Total time: 0.5 hours
17/10 Meeting with Professor De Zayas
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See ‘Interactive Research’
Total time: approx. 3 hours
18/10 Research day at UN library
Phone call and meeting set up with Natalie Schweizer
Total time: Approx 6 hours
20/10 Background reading, approx 3 hours
24/10
- Reading through Working Group reports on Declaration
- Emailed potential contacts in New Zealand: Matiu Dickson (law professor
specializing on Maori issues at Waikato University, New Zealand); Grant Morris
(law professor at Victoria University, New Zealand who also served on the
Waitangi Disputes Tribunal), Simon Dench (high school history teacher who is
knowledgeable on Maori legal issues)
- 2pm-3pm meeting with Natalie Schweizer see ‘Interactive Research’
- Exploration of UN documents list, frustrated by fruitlessness of the find
Total time: Approx. 6 hours

25/10 Reading. Exploring different ‘clusters’ of the declaration; e.g definition, land, selfdetermination, process
Total time: Approx 3 hours
26/10
Research on customary law angle at UN library, approx 3 hours
27/10 ISP Advising with Gyula Csurgai
Highlighted importance of interactive research
Total time: Approx. 0.25hrs
28/10 Miscellaneous
Prepared interview questions for de Zayas
Looked through disk
Chose most intriguing articles of Dec
Settled on self-determination
Total time: approx. 2 hours
31/10 Making contacts
Rang Julian Burger, follow-up email: meeting for week of 12-16 Nov
Rang DoCip, follow up email, requesting documentation
Emailed Natalie, would she please be my advisor, does she think topic is appropriate
Emailed Professor Anaya, University of Arizona
Emailed Siegfried Wiessner, Professor of Law and Director of the Graduate Program in
Intercultural Human Rights at St. Thomas University School of Law in Miami, Florida.
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Emailed Carwyn Jones, Victoria University, New Zealand
Emailed Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NZ
Total time: 2 hours
1/11
Two interviews at DoCip
Approx 4 hours
6/11
Interview Ambassador Barnes
Approx 3 hours
7/11
Rang Samia Slimane, left voicemail, sent follow up email
Emailed Les Malezer, FAIRA
Emailed Paul Joffe, Grand Council of the Crees
Emailed Tonya Fischner, AILA
Read Bohre thesis
Read shadow report Ronald Barnes
Read and summarized existing documentation
Set up appointments for next week
Total: Approx 7 hours
8/11
Writing, reading
Approx. 5 hours
13/11
Reading of previous ISPs
Reading of Thornberry
Reading of Pritchard
Approx 3 hours
14/11
Reading of Pritchard continued
Reading of Working Group reports
Phone call to Julian Burger
Approx 7 hours
16/11 – 22/11
Sick with tummy bug. See illness report
19/11
Cancellation of interview with Alfred de Zayas
20/11
Editing of work journal, made phone calls, read articles from DoCip website,
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writing
Approx. 2 hours
21/11
- Interview Morse Flores
- Interview Binota Moy Dhamai
Approx 4 hours
23/11
- Write-up of interviews from 21/11
- Reading
- Writing
Approx. 6 hours
24/11
Email and phone with Julian Burger
Construction of outline for draft
Approx 4 hours
25/11
Email and phone with Julian Burger
Writing
Approx 5 hours
26/11
Discussion with Julian Burger
Writing
Approx 5 hours
27/11
Writing
Approx 6 hours
28/11
Writing
Approx 9 hours
29/11
Final editing of work journal and ISP
Printing and binding
Approx 9 hours
30/11
Construction of powerpoint
Construction of outline
Approx 4 hours
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